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CAUSATION AND JUSTICE: A COMMENT
PATRICK J. KELLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Causation draws thoughtful torts professors like a flame draws
moths. The philosopher in him or her is drawn to the questions: What
does causation mean? And how do we learn about causation? The sys-
temizer sees in causation a possible basis for justifying or reformulating
tort law; the teacher picks up a wealth of intriguing hypotheticals to test
and stretch students' minds, as well as a set of confusing legal opinions
for critical analysis.
My friend Arno Becht is above all a dedicated teacher. His work on
causation' reflects that commitment to teaching. With a limited
number of basic assumptions and a narrow focus on cause in fact, he
and his coauthor Frank Miller hammered out a set of analytical tools
and then applied them to categorize and pick apart a number of prob-
lem cases. Intellectual rigor, clarity, and honesty marked their work.
Shortly before Professors Becht and Miller published their work,
H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honor6 published Causation in the Law,2 some-
what broader in scope and more philosophical in tone. The Hart and
Honor6 book later inspired Richard Epstein,3 who developed a unified
theory of tort liability drawing on a causal theory similar to Hart and
Honor6's. In this commentary, I hope to pull those two causal theories
apart and examine their weaknesses-invoking Arno Becht's analytical
spirit without following precisely his path.
II. HART AND HONORi
Many torts scholars argue that the only real question of causation in
a tort case is whether the harm would have occurred without the con-
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University. B.A., 1965, University of Notre
Dame; J.D., 1969, University of Iowa.
1. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND
STRICT LIABILITY CASES (1961).
2. H. HART & A. HONOR , CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959).
3. Epstein, .4 7heory ofStrict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).
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duct in question.4 Any further limitation on liability couched in terms
of proximate cause must be based on policy grounds unrelated to
causal relationships. 5 Hart and Honor6 set out to refute that common
view and to defend what they call the traditional view.6 They admit
that a policy choice underlies the decision to recognize causing harm as
an element in legal responsibility.7 They claim, however, that particu-
lar questions of whether a defendant's act was the cause of harm are
questions of fact, not questions of policy, even though not limited to the
issue of whether the harm would have occurred without the defendant's
act.8 This claim invites the obvious question: What is the difference
between a question of fact and a question of policy? They answer:
iTlhe traditional insistence that questions of causation are questions of
fact ... meant that the criteria for deciding such questions were not in-
ventions of the law but were to be found outside the law in what was
assumed, rightly or wrongly, to be part of the ordinary man's stock of
general notions.9
If ordinary usage of causal terms itself depends on judgments about
moral responsibility, however, then logically those moral judgments
must be different from the judgment that you are morally responsible
for harm for which you were the cause. Thus the causation question
would really be resolved by an implicit reference to those moral judg-
ments without further inquiry into whether they ought to control legal
decision. But Hart and Honor6 themselves recognize that the decision
to adopt common judgments about moral responsibility as the basis for
legal liability must be a policy decision.' 0 Their defense of the tradi-
tional view thus stands or falls with their ability to show that the com-
mon man distinguishes the cause of harm from other necessary or
sufficient conditions of the harm on morally-neutral grounds that de-
rive solely from the ordinary meaning of causal terms.
Hart and Honor6 argue that "cause and effect" is an empirical notion
with a core meaning derived from standard cases. We apply causal
4. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 239 (1971). See also
McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REv. 149, 153 (1925), who provides an exception to
the general principle in a situation where two independent causes concur and each of them would
have been sufficient to cause the identical result.
5. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 244-46.
6. H. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 2, at 3-6, 85-89. See generally Beale, The Proximate
Consequences of anAct, 33 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1920).
7. H. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 2, at 86.
8. Id
9. Id
10. Id at 62.
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language in other cases by analogy to the standard cases. No one,
therefore, can give a single all-inclusive definition of causation. To un-
derstand the meanings of causal terms we must look to the standard
case and the analogies extending causal terms to other cases."
For Hart and Honor6, the paradigm case of "cause and effect" is this:
A human being by a positive action manipulates an object to produce a
desired effect. 12 This gives us the core meaning of causation:
Common experience teaches us that, left to themselves, the things we ma-
nipulate, since they have a "nature" or characteristic way of behaving,
would persist in states or exhibit changes different from those which we
have learned to bring about in them by our manipulation. The notion,
that a cause is essentially something which interferes with or intervenes in
the course of events which would normally take place, is central to the
common-sense concept of cause . 13
Ordinary usage shows what is crucial in the paradigm case. We com-
monly call negative conditions and omissions causes, although they ex-
ert neither force nor movement. The central notion cannot therefore be
one of force or movement; instead the central notion must be that of a
change in the ordinary or normal course of events.' 4 One's failure to
take ordinary or normal precautions against harm can therefore be
seen as the cause of the harm not prevented. 5
Hart and Honor6 claim that this notion of causation as a change in
the normal course of events provides one of the two bases in ordinary
usage for distinguishing between the cause or causes of an event and
"mere [necessary] conditions."' 6 This distinction, they claim, is "ex-
planatory"-based solely on common sense notions of causation-and
not "attributive"-based on notions of moral responsibility.'7 The first
way to distinguish cause from mere condition is to determine which
conditions are normal and which abnormal. "[Normal] conditions
which are present as part of the usual state or mode of operation of the
thing under inquiry" are mere conditions.'" The abnormal condition
that "'makes the difference' between the accident and things going on
11. Id at 24-26.
12. Id at 27.
13. Id
14. Id at 27-29.
15. Id at 35-36.
16. Id at 30-31.
17. Id
18. Id at 32-33.
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as usual" can qualify as "the cause." 19 The second way to discover the
cause is to look for "a voluntary human action intended to bring about
what in fact happens."2 That act qualifies as a cause, whether or not it
is abnormal and regardless of the existence of abnormal necessary con-
ditions that could qualify as causes under the first test.2'
Hart and Honor6 cannot support the claim that their distinction be-
tween cause and mere conditions derives solely from the common sense
notion of causation without reference to noncausal notions. The first
way to identify mere conditions (by distinguishing between abnormal
and normal necessary conditions) suffers from a defect in their prior
analysis of the common notion of causation. They say that the actor's
manipulation of an object in the paradigm case is a cause because it
changes the "normal course of events." By analogy, one's failure to
take normal precautions to prevent harm is a cause, too, because it
changes the "normal course of events." Not all omissions that are nec-
essary conditions of the event are causal, then: only omissions of nor-
mal or ordinary precautions qualify.
Hart and Honor6's argument plays on an ambiguity in the phrase,
"normal course of events." In describing any purely physical system,
the "normal" course of events is the expected course of events, at least
theoretically predictable by reference to general rules of physical causa-
tion. In describing human activity, the "normal" or expected course of
events refers to traditional or habitual behavior, predictable only be-
cause that is the way people in general or one person in particular have
in the past chosen to act.22 Hart and Honor6 shift from the first mean-
ing to the second in moving from the paradigm case to the case of cau-
sation by omission. This can be seen by reading the meaning assigned
it in the omission case back into the paradigm case. Assume I normally
make tea every morning by boiling water and pouring it into a cup with
a tea bag. Those acts, clearly causal in the paradigm sense, would not
be causal under the meaning assigned to "normal" in the omission
case. This drastic change in the meaning of "normal" in the two cases
undercuts Hart and Honors's claim that the core meaning of causation
19. Id at 33.
20. Id at 39.
21. Id at 38-41.
22. Even an extreme behavioristic assumption will not equate these two meanings of "nor-
mal" since the behaviorist would have to say that an individual's failure to take a normal precau-
tion is determined and theoretically predictable by reference to general "scientific" laws of human
behavior.
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in the paradigm case applies by analogy only to omission of a "normal"
precaution. Once they eliminate the element of forceful intervention
from the core meaning of causation, all that Hart and Honor6 can
mean by saying that the actor's manipulation in the paradigm case
changed the normal course of events is that without the manipulation
events proceeding according to ordinary physical laws would have
been different. But that, of course, is just the old notion of a cause as a
necessary condition of the event in question. And that notion provides
no basis for saying that my omission of a "normal" precaution to pre-
vent your injury is any more of a cause than Joe Doak's omission of an
extraordinary precaution. To say that my omission, rather than Joe's,
is the cause is just to say that I am morally responsible for your injury
and Joe is not.
Hart and Honors's second basis for distinguishing cause from mere
conditions also depends on noncausal notions. Under their theory, the
same physical act could be the cause or a mere condition of harm de-
pending solely on the intention of the actor. If John drives "normally"
down the street and hits a child who runs in front of his car, John's
driving may not be the cause of the harm under Hart and Honors's
theory. If John saw the child a long way off, saw that their paths would
collide, and continued on intending to hit the child, his driving would
be the cause of the harm. Hart and Honor 's claim that we distinguish
the two cases in causal terms is puzzling. Ordinarily, we apply causal
terminology interchangeably to accidental and intentional conduct
causing harm: Thus, we say (1) "John hit him and broke his jaw," and
(2) "John hit him accidentally and broke his jaw." The inclusion of the
modifier "accidentally" does not change the causal claims, 23 and we
would still say "John hit him and broke his jaw" even when John's
conduct was "normal" in all respects. The basis for the distinction be-
tween the first and the second case must be something other than the
common sense meaning of causation.
One need not look far to discover the basic concept underlying Hart
and Honors's attempt to distinguish causes from mere conditions. The
common man has a well-developed sense of justice: each of us ought to
give to others what is their due.24 One who fails to give another his due
has wronged him. Tort law developed to provide redress for private
23. Cf. Pitcher, Hart on Action and Responsibility, 60 Philosophical.Review 226, 233-35 (claim
that .4 hit B not defeated by saying it was accidental).
24. See generally' H. Sidgwick, THE METHODS OF ETHICS (5th ed. 1893), reprinted as The
Common Notion ofJustice. Analysis, in JUSTICE & SOCIAL POLICY 3 (F. Olafson ed. 1961).
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injustices: one who has harmed another by conduct insufficiently re-
spectful of his personal dignity (what is his due) ought to compensate
the victim to redress the private injustice. One who voluntarily acts
intending to cause harm to another obviously has not given him his
due. To say that the actor is the only cause of the harm is just to say
that he alone wronged the victim. Similarly, one who does not intend
harm, but whose abnormal or unexpected behavior harms another, has
not given the victim his due, for the victim could reasonably expect
normal behavior, and the abnormal behavior therefore indicates disre-
spect for his personal dignity. Here again, to say that the actor is the
only cause of the harm is just to say that he alone wronged the victim.
Common sense notions of justice are at work here, not common sense
notions of causation.
III. EPSTEIN
In 1973 Richard Epstein published an interesting article25 attempting
a unified theory of torts based on a theory of causation similar to that
of Hart and Honor6. Epstein set out "to develop a normative theory of
torts that takes into account common sense notions of individual re-
sponsibility."'26 He argued that neither a theory of moral blameworthi-
ness nor a theory of economic efficiency can provide an adequate
theoretical base for tort law: the first because we traditionally impose
tort liability on a number of defendants such as the insane who are not
morally blameworthy; the second because there are no scales to weigh
the factors that must be weighed to decide in accordance with the goal
of economic efficiency; and both because neither provides a basis for
decision when the conduct of both parties is "reasonable" under their
relevant criteria.27 Epstein therefore proposes that a prima facie suffi-
cient reason for imposing liability in tort is that the defendant caused
the plaintiff harm.28 To support this theory, Epstein then has to show
25. See note 3 supra. Before Epstein published his work on causation, Abraham Harari used
Hart and Honor6's distinction between abnormal conditions that count as causes and normal con-
ditions that are mere conditions to elaborate his theory that the question of negligence ought to be
part of a broader, purely causal inquiry. A. HARARI, THE PLACE OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE LAW OF
TORTS (1962). To Harari the only important question is whether defendant's conduct was an
abnormal condition and hence a cause of the harm. Insofar as Harari accepts without further
analysis the causal theory of Hart and Honor6, his analysis of causation suffers from the same
basic defects as theirs.
26. Epstein, supra note 3, at 151.
27. Id at 153, 156-57.
28. Id at 157-60.
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that "the term causation has a content which permits its use in a princi-
pled manner to help solve particular cases. . . . [The concept of causa-
tion] must be explicated and shown to be a suitable basis for the
assignment of responsibility."
29
Epstein argued that the sine qua non or "but for" test-would the
harm have occurred without the defendant's conduct?-does not corre-
spond to the ordinary meaning of causation because the causation
question asks what did happen and the sine qua non test asks what
would have happened had things been otherwise.3" The same view of
causation that led Epstein to reject the "but for" test led him to argue
that omissions cannot be causes. An omission is not something that
happened; therefore it cannot be a cause since the causation question
asks what did happen."
Epstein's conclusion seems inconsistent with his announced method
of explicating the common sense notion of causation: We often speak
of omissions as causes, even in cases where the one who omits a precau-
tion has not himself created the dangerous condition. Here, Epstein
differs from Hart and Honor6,32 Becht and Miller,33 and John Stuart
Mfil, 34 who all agree that the common man recognizes omissions as
causes. Hart and Honor&'s examples ring true to ordinary usage: We
say "the failure of the gardener to water the flowers caused their
death,"35 and the "signalman's failure to pull the lever was the cause of
the accident. 36 Moreover, Epstein himself does not consistently ad-
here to his argument. In discussing whether an intervening act severs
the causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the harm,
he argues as follows:
[Aissume that the defendant leaves a vase precariously perched on the
edge of a high shelf. Y picks up that vase and throws it upon the head of
the plaintiff who was sitting in a position where he could have been struck
by the vase if it had fallen. Here the defendant is not liable because there
is no causal connection between his conduct and the plaintiffs harm. Y
could have caused the same destruction even if that vase had been placed
in a safe and stable position in the middle of the shelf. The dangerous
29. Id at 160.
30. Id
31. Id at 190-91.
32. H. HART & A. HONORI, supra note 2, at 28-30.
33. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note I, at 21-25.
34. See H. HART & A. HONOR., supra note 2, at 15.
35. Id at 35.
36. Id at 15.
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potential in the antecedent situation did not "result in" harm to the
plaintiff.
37
What is that but the "but for" test?
But Epstein's arguments suffer from a deeper flaw. He said that the
causation question asks what did happen. He seemed to assume that
causation is something that we can see. But a moment's reflection
should convince us that all we see are events. Thus, if we ask what
happened and limit the answer to what can be perceived by the senses,
we would have to say: A hit B on the nose and then B's nose bled. To
say that A caused B's nosebleed is to assert a particular relationship
between A's hitting and B's bleeding. We don't see that relationship,
we conclude that the events are related in a certain way. If what we
mean by causation is that the second event (B's bleeding) would not
have happened without the first event (A's hitting), the causal judgment
even in this simple case depends on an implicit reference to what would
have happened otherwise. And if that is what causation means, there is
no logical difficulty in considering omissions as causes. Epstein cannot
reject sine qua non as the meaning of causation on the ground that the
question of causation is a question of fact without also asserting that
only that directly perceived counts as a fact.
Epstein's refusal to recognize that causation is a relationship, not an
event, infects the rest of his analysis. Understandably, he refuses to
attempt a definition of causation.3" Instead, he explores four para-
digms covered by the proposition A caused B harm, that he claims ex-
haust the application of that proposition: 39 (1) A hit B, (2) A frightened
B, (3) A compelled B to hit C, and (4) A created the dangerous condi-
tion that resulted in harm to B.40 To avoid the charge of circularity
brought against inclusion of the phrase "resulted in" in the fourth para-
digm, Epstein limits that phrase to reference to one of the first three
paradigms.4' Thus the fourth paradigm case of causing harm should
be restated as follows: A created the dangerous condition that either (a)
hit B, (b) frightened B, or (c) compelled B to hit C. Except for para-
digm cases 2 and 4(b), however, these cases are not causal paradigms at
all, for they only describe the cause and do not mention the effect: Thus
37. Epstein, supra note 3, at 183. Note also his argument about "large" intervening forces.
1d at 184.
38. id at 165-66.
39. Id at 191 (by implication).
40. Id at 166-89.
41. Id at 177.
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"A hit B" simply describes A's action, it does not assert any causal
relationship between A's action and B's harm. Similarly, although "A
compelled B to hit C" does assert a causal relation between some un-
specified conduct of A's (an omission, perhaps?) and B's hitting C; it
does not assert a causal relation between that conduct and any harm to
C. And, although the word "created" asserts a causal relationship
between A's conduct and a dangerous condition, neither 4(a) nor 4(c)
asserts a causal relationship between that conduct and harm to B or C.
"A frightened B" asserts a causal relationship between some unspeci-
fied conduct of A's and B's being frightened; ordinary usage would not
limit that conduct to positive acts, as Epstein would have us believe.
For instance, we would say: "You frightened me when you didn't call
as you usually do."
A charitable reader might protest that Epstein said that these were
paradigm cases covered by the proposition, "A caused B harm." One
should therefore supply the missing event for Epstein in each paradigm
case: thus A hit B, causing him harm; and A created the dangerous
condition that (a) hit B, causing him harm, (b) frightened B, or (c)
compelled B to hit C, causing him harm. Supplying the omission,
however, weakens Epstein's claim that these four paradigms all identify
positive acts of A and exhaust the meaning of "A caused B harm."
Paradigm cases (2) and (3) are not on their face limited to positive acts
by A, and if "creation" in paradigm (4) is limited to positive acts
(which as a matter of ordinary usage seems probable), the four para-
digms do not exhaust the meaning of "A caused B harm," for 4's fail-
ure to eliminate a dangerous condition, in ordinary usage, can also be
said to have caused B harm. By emphasizing the obvious fact that cau-
sation is a relationship, not an event, the reformulation highlights these
weaknesses in Epstein's argument.
Epstein claimed that the basic rationale for tort liability was this: As
between two innocent parties, the one who caused the harm should
bear the lOSS.4 2 He recognized that if all necessary conditions are
causes of the harm, this rationale can never help in deciding which of
the two parties should bear the loss since both parties could always be
said to have caused the harm under that test. His failure to make good
on his claim that ordinary usage limits the causes of harm to positive
human acts of the four paradigm types thus undermines his whole
theory.
42. Id at 152, 159-60.
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Epstein's ultimate purpose in all this was to formulate a normative
theory of torts based on common sense notions of individual responsi-
bility and, in the process, to combat the prevailing utilitarian theories
of tort law. That is an admirable purpose with which I am in sympa-
thy. Epstein put up a valiant effort, but it was doomed from the start:
common sense notions of causation are not common sense notions of
individual responsibility. To carry out Epstein's program, one must
analyze and evaluate common sense notions of justice. But American
law professors, raised on a steady diet of positivism, find it hard to talk
about justice.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss4/5
